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ABSTRACT
Korea relies more than 70 percent of food supply on a limited number of
exporting counties. If the suppliers possess market power, the food security matters.
This study tested whether the major exporting countries of corn and wheat have power
of determining market prices and enjoy oligopolistic profit in Korea.
The empirical results indicate that Korea shows a high degree of import
loyalty toward U.S. products. It is evident that the U.S. and Australia have market
power in the wheat market, while no distinct power is detected in the corn market.
The result for the corn market seems to reflect the severe price competition between
the two major exporters, the U.S. and China. It is also shown that the launch of the
WTO does not significantly change the structure of market power in the markets
considered.
Key Words: market power, food security, import loyalty,
residual demand elasticity
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Introduction
Korea is one of the most important importing countries in the international
agricultural trade. Korea imported more than 15 million tons of grain in the year 2000.
The self-sufficiency rate is less than one percent for corn and wheat and less than ten
percent for soybeans. This high level of food dependency on foreign suppliers may
result in fragile food security in Korea.
 Food security can be defined as a situation in which all households have
both physical and economic access to adequate food for all members and are not at
risk of loosing such access (Ohga 1998). If the domestic agricultural import markets
are dominated by a limited number of exporters and these exporters possess
monopolistic or oligopolistic power in the price determination process, the economic
accessibility would be fragile. If this is the case, the food security matters and it is
important to increase the portion of domestic supply and to adopt more efficient
import practices.
The objective of this paper is to determine if the U.S. and other major
exporters of agricultural products have market power in the agricultural import
markets in Korea. Specifically, this study conducts two analyses. First, Korea’s import
loyalty to an exporter is estimated, which can be defined as a probability of repeated3
import from a specific export source. The import loyalty is estimated using the
Markov model based on market shares (Telser 1962; Wilson, Koo, and Carter 1990).
Second, the market power of each exporter is estimated. In the industrial
organization theory, Lerner's index, defined as the ratio of the difference between
price and marginal cost to price, is used to measure the degree of market power
(Lerner 1934). But, as the marginal cost in a specific industry or country is usually not
measurable, the marginal cost is often replaced by the average cost. However, this
requires a strong assumption that the technology in the industry is linearly
homogeneous.
This paper uses two methods to estimate exporters’ market power. First,
Goldberg and Knetter (1999) proposed an econometric method of estimating the
market power using the residual demand elasticity. Instead of estimating the market
power directly, this method tests the hypothesis of no monopolistic power in the
residual demand that is faced solely by the underlying exporter. This method requires
relatively less data and is easy to use.
Second, Nevo (1996) presents a method of estimating market power, in which
the price-cost mark-up is directly estimated. In this model the market power can be
estimated without requiring information about the cost.4
This study adopts the three complementary methods above, which can lead to
more reliable conclusions. In addition, the effect of the institutional shock from the
UR agricultural negotiations is also analyzed. It is likely that the world trade patterns
change with the launch of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, we test if
there is any significant change in the market power after 1995.
The results of this study will provide important implications to policy
alternatives for food security. If the major exporters possess market power in the
pricing mechanism, it is suggested to maintain a minimum level of domestic
production capacity, to diversify import sources, and to use futures markets and long-
term contracts to reduce risk involved in imports. If the exporters' market power
changes after the WTO era, the result will have important implication to the next
round WTO negotiations.
The Model
Import Loyalty and the Markov Process
The Markov process provides a transition probability matrix that measures a
tendency of repeated behavior or, equivalently, a chance to switch. In import analyses,
it measures how loyal an importing country is toward a specific exporting country.
The Markov process is specified as follows:5
The transition probability matrix is the matrix of conditional probabilities that a
specific brand (or product) is to be repurchased (diagonal elements) or switched to
some other brand (off-diagonal elements) at time t given the brand (or product) was
purchased at time t-1. If a diagonal element is large, it is said that the probability of
repeated purchase is large and the consumer is loyal to the specific brand (or product).
If, on the other hand, the probability of repeated purchase is low, the consumer is apt
to switch brands. Since the rows of the matrix sum to unity, small numbers of
diagonal elements imply relatively large numbers of off-diagonal elements, which
indicate large chances of purchasing different brands from the previous purchase.
The magnitude of import loyalty depends on many factors. Consumers’
attitude to buy would be the key factor. Some consumers may frequently switch
brands, while others simply stick to specific brands. In addition, quality or product
characteristics would also be an important factor. Trade policies (importing or
exporting) and/or marketing practices also significantly affect the switching
probabilities. However, the model specified above is not able to identify factors
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determining the transition probability. It only tells the overall tendency. More
complicated econometric models are needed for complete identification of the reasons.
But this is beyond the scope of this study.
The Markov model can be estimated by minimizing the sum of squared errors
given two constraints for probability:
The transition probabilities are estimated under two assumptions. First, the process is
a first order process. In other words, the purchase at time t depends only on the
purchase at time t-1 (not on the history before t-1). Second, The process is stationary.
This implies that the moments of the process are time-invariant. Given the
assumptions, the steady-state market share of each brand can be calculated by
multiplying the transition probability matrix until the columns of the outcome become
identical. These are long-run equilibrium market shares under the current condition of
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Residual Demand Elasticity Model
The Lerner index is defined as the ratio of the difference between price and
marginal cost to price. This indicates how much the price deviates from the optimal
pricing under perfect competition. However, use of this index involves several
problems. First, it is very difficult to measure the marginal cost using the accounting
data available. The data usually are aggregated, and it is costly and time-consuming to
disaggregate, if not impossible. In most cases, the data are confidential because they
are critically important for competitors. Tax is another reason to keep the data from
leaking out.
An alternative to the Lerner index is the elasticity of the residual demand
faced by the exporter under consideration. The residual demand is the demand faced
by an exporting country after taking into account the supply response of the
competing countries in the import market.
Figure 1 depicts the residual demand for an exporter. The left panel of the
figure depicts the market in which the import demand curve interacts with the supply
curve of all other exporters except the exporter considered. The right panel shows the
situation in which the residual demand schedule interacts with the exporting country’s
supply schedule. Since the exporter faces the residual demand alone, it will be a8
monopolistic supplier. If the residual demand curve is flat, there is no room for the
exporter to exercise the monopolistic power and the exporter faces the price
determined by the left panel. If, on the other hand, the residual demand curve is steep,
a monopolistic profit is possible by pricing the marginal cost equal to the marginal
revenue. The steeper the curve is, the higher the excess profit is, and vise versa. This
is a one-to-one mapping to the market power implied by the Lerner index. Thus, the
market power can be deduced from the residual demand elasticity (strictly speaking,
price flexibility).
Since the residual demand is determined by the difference between the import
demand and the supply of competitors in the market, the demand shifters in the
importing country and the supply shifters of competing countries are key factors
determining the price. Goldberg and Knetter (1999) suggest an inverse demand model
to estimate the residual demand elasticity. Following them, we specify the residual
demand model as follows:
RGDP = real GDP in the importing country
E = exchange rate
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LCI = wage index
superscript ex = the exporting country
superscript 1 and 2 = competing country 1 and 2.
Since the model in equation 3 is the inverse demand in double logarithmic
form, the coefficient of the quantity η  is the price flexibility. The residual demand
would be flat if the price flexibility is zero (or equivalently infinite demand elasticity),
implying no market power. If the exporter enjoys market power, the coefficient will be
negatively significant.
The effect of freer trade with the launch of the WTO on the market power is
analyzed with intercept and slope dummy variables. The null hypothesis of no WTO
effect is tested with zero coefficient of the slope dummy.
Multinomial Logit Model
Nevo(1996) suggests a market share model to estimate the price-marginal
cost mark-up (MU). The markup, which is the numerator of the Lerner index, can be
derived from the profit maximization function for the exporting country. The profit
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The first order condition for profit maximization is
which can be rewritten for the mark-up as
To estimate the markup in equation 6, the marginal effect of price on the market share
should be estimated. The marginal effects for all exporters can be estimated using a
system of multinomial logit model as follows:
The null hypothesis of no market power of the ith exporter is Ho: α i = 0. As for the
residual demand approach, the WTO effect is tested using dummy variable.
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This study determines the market power of major exporting countries in the wheat
and corn markets. The data needed for this study are import quantity and price,
exchange rate, wholesale price index, and wage index by exporting country, and
Korea’s GDP for a demand shifter. Major exporters of wheat include the U.S., Canada,
and Australia. In the corn market, the U.S. and China are dominant exporters.
The quarterly data for import quantity and price are from Monthly Report of Trade
Statistics by National Statistics Office. Other data are from IMF’s International
Financial Statistics. Considering data availability, the sample period covers the first
quarter of 1993 through the third quarter of 1999 for wheat, and from the first quarter
of 1991 to the third quarter of 1999 for corn.
Figures 2 and 3 show historical market shares for the two crops. The wheat import
market shows significant changes in the market share. In 1993 and 1994, Canada was
the largest exporter after which the U.S. took the position. However, the U.S. share
consistently decreases over time, while the share for the rest of the world (ROW)
soars since 1998. Canada’s share fades out recently, while Australia has a stable
market share at around 20% throughout the sample period.
The market structure for the corn import market looks much simpler with12
only two major exporters, the U.S. and China. However, the competition between the
two players is evidently more severe. The trade pattern shows that the market is
dominated by China whenever China has stock to export. Until 1994 when the
Chinese production dropped significantly due to severe drought, the U.S. dominated
the market. But, China resumed her seat soon with a good harvest in 1997.
Imports from China have several advantages over the U.S. Since China
locates closer than the U.S., the transportation takes a shorter time with a lower cost.
In addition, the order size can be much smaller for the Chinese crop due to the
distance, which should be at least 50 thousand tons from the U.S. The Korean
importers tend to prefer importing from China unless the U.S. price is low enough to
compensate differences in quality and procurement costs.
Empirical Results
Wheat Market
Table 1 shows the estimated transition probability matrix. The U.S. enjoys the
highest import loyalty with 0.86, while that for Canada is 0.69 and 0.51 for Australia.
The probability of switching import sources from the U.S. to Canada is zero, and that
to Australia is 0.142. However, the switching probability from Australia to the U.S. is13
zero, implying that Australia would take the market share from the U.S. over time.
This is evident in Table 2. The steady-state market share for the U.S. lowers
while that for Australia gains.  In the long run, the market growth for ROW is
distinct. Under the current trade and marketing strategies, the wheat import market in
Korea seems to allow no dominant exporter.
Table 3 shows the estimated price flexibilities from the residual demand
models. The estimates are statistically significant for all three exporters, implying
these exporters enjoy market power in the wheat import market. The number for the
U.S. is –0.38 and the largest among the three. The t-test results indicate that the
launch of the WTO does not show any significant (statistically) change in the market
power, even though the U.S. and Canada gain power while Australia looses.
The multinomial logit model provides similar results to the residual demand
model (Table 4). The U.S. and Australia show significant mark-ups, while that for
Canada fails to reject the null hypothesis of zero mark-up. The Lerner index is 0.75
for the U.S. implying a distinct market power. As in the previous model, the t-test
confirms that the WTO does not affect the magnitude of market power.14
Corn Market
The transition probability matrix for the corn market is shown in Table 5. The
diagonal element is estimated 0.90 for the U.S. and 0.93 for China, indicating a high
degree of import loyalty to both countries. China enjoys higher loyalty as expected.
The switching probability from the U.S. to China is 0.028 while that from China to
the U.S. is 0.064. These low switching probabilities imply the importance of being the
dominant exporter. For the remnant exporter, aggressive marketing strategies are
essential to regain the market. China is shown to gain the long run equilibrium market
shares at the cost of the U.S. (Table 6).
The price flexibility measuring the market power is shown in Table 7.
Differently from the wheat market, the exporters do not seem to have significant
market power in the corn market. In addition, the launch of the WTO does not cause
any change in the market power.
The multinomial logit model also confirms the insignificant market power
(Table 8). The same inference can be made for the WTO effect on market power.15
Conclusions
Korea meets most of domestic demand for wheat and corn with imports. This
high dependency of the products on foreign supply endangers food security especially
when the international market is noncompetitive or the exporters have market power.
Many economists in Korea, however, do not agree with the existence of market power
suggesting severe competition in the world markets of the products as evidence.
This study tests whether major exporters of wheat and corn possess power of
determining market price and enjoys oligopolistic profit in Korea. The empirical
results indicate that Korea shows a high degree of import loyalty toward U.S.
products. It is evident that the U.S. and Australia have market power in the wheat
market, while no distinct power is detected in the corn market. The result for the corn
market seems to reflect the severe price competition between the U.S. and China.
These results suggest that market structure does not necessarily determine market
performance. It is also shown that the launch of the WTO does not significantly
change the structure of market power in the markets considered.16
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Table 1.    Transition Probability Matrix for Wheat Imports
Time t
USA CAN AUS ROE
USA 0.858 0 0.142 0
CAN 0.175 0.690 0.135 0
AUS 0 0.250 0.514 0.236
Time
t-1
ROE 0.075 0.031 0.137 0.757
Table 2.    Steady-state Market Share in the Wheat Import Market
USA CAN AUS ROE
Import  Loyalty  0.858  0.690    0.514   0.757
Average Market
Share
  0.397   0.228    0.221   0.154
LR Market Share  0.361(­ )  0.201(­ )  0.222(¬ )  0.216(¬ )











Numbers in the parentheses are t-values.
**: indicates significance at the 1% level.
* :indicates significance at the 5% level.18
Table 4.    Estimated Mark-up for Wheat Exporting Countries
USA CAN AUS ROE
Mark-Up(MU)  0.143  0.037  0.055  0.059
t-value  3.990**  0.471  1.838  2.575*
Average  Price  0.188  0.156  0.174  0.108
Lerner  Index  0.758  0.236  0.317  0.549
t-value for WTO
effect
  -0.051    0.035   -0.134   -0.032
** indicates significance at the 1 % level
* indicates significance at the 5 % level
Table 5. Transition Probability Matrix for Corn Imports
Time t
USA CHI ROE
USA 0.900 0.028 0.071
CHI 0.064 0.934 0.001 Time t-1
ROE 0.517 0.346 0.137
Table 6. Steady-state Market Share in the Corn Import Market
USA CHI ROE
Import Loyalty 0.900 0.934 0.137
Average Market Share 0.523 0.439 0.038
LR Market Share     0.509(­ )     0.448(¬ )     0.043(¬ )19






T-value for WTO effect   -1.347     0.434
Numbers in the parentheses are t-values.
Table 8. Estimated Mark-up for Corn Exporting Countries
USA CHI ROE
Mark-Up(MU) 0.017 0.014 -0.060
t-value 0.559 0.583 -4.075*
Average Price 0.140 0.131   0.142




* indicates significance at the 1% level.
Figure 1. The concept of Residual Demand and Market Power
a










Demand Market Demand   Residual20
Figure 2. Historical Shares of wheat exporting countries in Korea
Figure 3. Historical Shares of corn exporting countries in Korea
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